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This paper examines three hypotheses concerning the relationship between
economic integration, the nation-state, and democracy. The first one, the
“diminished democracy” hypothesis, claims that in an integrating world
economy national policymakers are increasingly constrained in their ability
to produce the public goods the voters demand. Actually, there is little
empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. Even in the EU, where most
markets are highly integrated, the absence of tax harmonisation has not led
to a situation where national governments are forced to provide a lower
level of public services than the citizens would otherwise wish. On the
contrary, the average tax rates and levels of public service provisions of the
poorer member states tend to rise to those of the richer countries.
In Europe the problem is not a “diminished democracy” at the
national level, but a “democratic deficit” at the supranational level.
According to the second hypothesis —“transnational federalism”— this
deficit could be corrected by transforming the present Union into a federal
state. Unfortunately, there is no indication that a majority, or even a
significant minority, of Europeans are willing to sacrifice the core of
national sovereignty in favour of a super-state. But this is not the only
problem with the federalist hypothesis. The basic flaw is that in a federation
of polities sharply divided along cultural, institutional and social lines, and
lacking the sense of national solidarity generated by shared historical
memories, any measure by the central government that differentially affects
the citizens of the separate states or regions, creates serious problems of
legitimacy. This means that the key democratic principle of final agenda
control by the majority could not be satisfied. As a consequence, a federal
Europe would face even more serious problems of democratic legitimation
than the present EU.
The third hypothesis –“transnational constitutionalism” –
acknowledges that democracy cannot flourish above the national level but
points out that constitutionalism can, since the purpose of constitutional
rules is not to enforce positive social rights, but to limit and control the use
of power. In the past such rules were defined by the national constitutions,
but in an increasingly interdependent world national power has to be
disciplined also externally. This is the function of the European treaties, of
the GATT/WTO rules, and of many specialised treaties dealing with such
matters as human rights, environmental protection or animal welfare.
Transnational constitutionalism can improve the quality of democracy
domestically, for example by limiting the discretionary power of national
executives.2
1. THE “DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY” SYNDROME
It has been well said that political power has determined frontiers while
economic power has the freedom of the world. As markets grow beyond
national boundaries it becomes increasingly difficult to evade the question:
can markets become international while politics remains national or even
sub-national? It is clear that in an integrating world economy the
effectiveness of some traditional instruments of policy is seriously eroded.
For example, the greater the degree of openness of a national economy, the
less effective Keynesian demand management will be as an instrument of
domestic stabilisation policy. This is true because some portion of any
additional government expenditure will be spent on imports from the rest of
the world, so that some of the demand-creating effect of the expenditure is
dissipated abroad.
The obsolescence of some policy instruments does not, however,
imply that democratic polities are no longer able to satisfy the demands of
their citizens. On the contrary, one of the indirect benefits of greater
economic integration could be an added incentive to find more adequate
solutions to old and new problems. Thus, the demand for more transparency
in public decision-making, the search for new forms of accountability, and
the growing reliance on persuasion rather than on traditional forms of
governmental coercion, can be shown to be related, at least in part, to the
process of growing economic and political interdependence among nations
(Majone 1996a). Moreover, it is sometimes possible to transfer policy-
making powers to a higher level of governance, so that what can no longer
be done at the national level may be achieved through international co-
operation. But under which conditions, within which limits is such a transfer
possible and what are its implications for democratic politics? These are the
issues with which this paper is concerned.
A heuristically useful starting point is a familiar result of international
economics known as the Mundell – Fleming theorem or, more informally, as
the “impossible trinity” or the “open-economy trilemma”. According to this
theorem, countries cannot simultaneously maintain an independent
monetary policy, capital mobility, and fixed exchange rates. If a government
chooses fixed exchange rates and capital mobility it has to give up monetary
autonomy. If it chooses monetary autonomy and capital mobility, it has to
go with floating exchange rates. Finally, if it wishes to combine fixed
exchange rates with monetary autonomy it has to limit capital mobility.
Economist Dani Rodrik has argued that the standard open-economy
trilemma can be extended to what he calls the political trilemma of the3
world economy (see Figure 1). The elements of Rodrik’s political trilemma
are: integrated national economies, the nation-state, and “mass politics”, i.e.
a democratic system characterised by a high degree of political mobilisation
and by institutions that are responsive to mobilised groups. The claim, as in
the standard trilemma, is that it is possible to have at most two of these
things. To quote Rodrik: “If we want true international economic
integration, we have to go either with the nation-state, in which case the
domain of national politics will have to be significantly restricted, or else
with mass politics, in which case we will have to give up the nation-state in
favour of global federalism. If we want highly participatory political
regimes, we have to choose between the nation-state and international
economic integration. If we want to keep the nation-state, we have to choose
between mass politics and international economic integration” (Rodrik
2000, 180).
Integrated National Economies
           
Nation-State Mass Politics
Figure 1: The False Trilemma
(Source: Rodrik 2000, 181)
Politics would not necessarily shrink under global federalism since
economic power and political power would then be aligned: all important
political and policy issues would be treated at the global level. A world
government is not in the domain of the politically possible, now or in the
foreseeable future, but even without it we are not, in fact, faced with the
stark trade-off envisaged by Rodrik between international economic
integration and public responsiveness to the wishes of the citizens.
According to him, the price of maintaining national sovereignty while
markets become international is that politics has to be exercised over a much
narrower range of issues: “The overarching goal of nation-states... would be
to appear attractive to international markets... Domestic regulations and tax
policies would be either harmonised according to international standards, or
structured such that they pose the least amount of hindrance to international
economic integration. The only local public goods provided would be those4
that are compatible with integrated markets” (Rodrik 2000, 182). In essence,
this is the “diminished democracy” thesis which has found wide, if
uncritical, acceptance among critics of globalisation.
The core of this thesis is an argument about the declining ability of
democratic policymakers to produce public policies that depart from market-
conforming principles. However, numerous studies have cast serious doubts
on the accuracy of any simple correlation, much less any causal link,
between increasing globalisation and a “diminished democracy” syndrome.
Thus, a recent econometric analysis using annual data from 1964 to 1993 for
16 OECD countries finds little evidence that international capital mobility
exerts systematic downward pressure on the public sector, the welfare state,
and public sector provisions (Swank 2001 and other studies cited therein).
These and other similar findings (see the next section) must appear
counter-intuitive to many critics of the globalisation of trade, but they are
quite understandable once we realise that the rules of the world trading
system do not restrict the autonomy of national policymakers in any
significant way. Members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) not only
enjoy domestic policy autonomy but must also respect the exercise of that
autonomy by other members. This basic principle is reflected in the most-
favoured-nation (MFN) principle, the fundamental function of which is to
ensure that each WTO member accord access to its markets independently
of any of the policies of the trading partner, including domestic policies.
Critics of globalisation also assert that under GATT and WTO rules a
government cannot protect from import competition those domestic
industries that have to bear the costs of environmental or other regulations
not applied by other countries. As Roessler (1996) has convincingly shown,
however, WTO rules do permit member states to take a domestic regulatory
measure raising the cost of production in combination with subsidies or
tariffs that maintain the competitive position of the domestic producers that
have to bear these costs. The only restriction is that if the compensatory
measures adversely affect the interests of other WTO members, procedures
designed to remove the adverse effects of those measures on third countries
must be observed.
A striking demonstration of the autonomy of national policymakers in
politically sensitive matters is provided by the WTO Agreement on sanitary
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, i.e., national regulations to protect the
health of humans, animals and plants. Under this Agreement each signatory
has the right to set its own standards in the health field. This presumption of
national autonomy can be challenged only by showing that a measure lacks5
a scientific justification. If a health measure has a scientific basis there is
little other countries can do to oppose it (Atik 1996-97). Operationally, the
existence of a scientific basis is shown by a risk assessment performed
according to internationally accepted methodologies (Majone 2002 a, where
the attempt by the European Commission to replace the SPS criteria by the
precautionary principle is discussed). It is precisely the combination of rigid
rules with flexible safeguards that has permitted the liberalisation of
international trade to proceed so far without any domestic policy
harmonisation. This subtle compromise makes possible the coexistence of
the two apparently opposing principles of domestic policy autonomy and the
globalisation of trade (Roessler 1996, 41).
2.  “SHALLOW V. DEEP” INTEGRATION
The arguments presented so far could be judged insufficient to challenge
Rodrik’s pessimistic scenario or to disprove the “diminished democracy”
hypothesis. It may be objected that the liberalisation of capital and goods
markets is a form of “shallow” integration – integration limited to measures
to remove controls and barriers that block exchange at national borders. As
international economic integration progresses, however, such measures are
no longer sufficient. Issues of “deeper” integration emerge on the
international agenda. These issues concern behind-the-border policies and
institutions that had previously not been subjected to international scrutiny
(Kahler 1995, 2). Domestic regulatory regimes, in particular, may have to be
replaced by internationally harmonised rules that cannot be tailored to
national preferences. Hence, it is concluded, the real threat to the autonomy
of democratically accountable policymakers comes from the harmonisation
bias of deeper integration, or, to use Rodrik’s terminology, from true
international economic integration.
An example of this line of reasoning is provided by the traditional
view of international tax competition. According to this view, because of
increasing economic integration capital becomes more footloose and
countries begin to compete to attract it by cutting their tax rates (see Tanzi
1995 for a careful discussion of the possibility that tax competition may
deteriorate tax systems). The process may reach a point where a country is
forced to provide a lower level of public services than its citizens would
otherwise wish. Given this scenario, tax harmonisation seems a reasonable
proposition. At a minimum, if tax cutting is matched by all nations, no
country gains a comparative advantage. Thus, international tax
harmonisation would resemble price fixing cartels among firms—a very
attractive strategy to all negotiating parties. In fact, one observes relatively6
little tax harmonisation, even among countries whose economies are
undergoing a process of deep integration.
By far the most important contemporary example of deep integration
of originally separate national economies is represented by the European
Community/European Union (EC/EU). Hence the process of European
integration provides the most rigorous test of the hypothesis that
international economic integration significantly reduces the capacity of
democratically elected policymakers to provide the public goods the voters
demand.
It has often been predicted, on the basis of the received view on tax
competition, that a failure to harmonise taxation in the EU will result in a
destructive competition among member states which will ultimately
undermine Europe’s generous welfare systems, but no such “race to the
bottom” can be observed so far. While barriers to trade and to capital
mobility have been falling almost continuously since the late 1950s, EU
countries have not experienced any significant degree of tax competition
and consequent fall of the tax rates. In fact, the average tax rates have been
climbing since the mid-1960s both in the original member states — the
Benelux countries, Germany, France and Italy—and in the countries of the
European “periphery” — Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Moreover, tax
rates have always been higher in the richer than in the poorer countries,
showing that the growing integration of Europe did not make the richer
members of the Community feel constrained by tax competition from low-
wage countries. Since the late 1970s the difference between the tax rates of
these two groups of countries has narrowed. However, this narrowing has
gone in the opposite direction to that predicted by the tax competition view,
with average tax rates in the peripheral countries approaching those of the
richer countries. Rather than in a race to the bottom, the member states of
the EU seem to have engaged in a race to the top.
There are also few signs that a race to the bottom in the provision of
public services is taking place in the European Union. Rather, as in the case
of taxation, the race has been in the other direction, with the southern
countries upgrading to northern levels of expenditure (Barnard, 2000). In
sum: even in a “deeply” integrated EU, “the nation-state is still the principal
site of policy change, and there remains ample scope for political choice... if
institutional arrangements and policy mixes are suitably modified, then the
core principles of the European social model can be preserved and in many
respects enhanced in their translation into the real worlds of European
welfare” (Ferrera et al. 2001, 164). Also a scholar like Fritz Scharpf, who
for years has warned about the significant decline in national problem-7
solving capacity caused by globalisation and European (negative)
integration, now acknowledges that there are still policy choices left, both at
national and European levels, so that the welfare state is not impotent and is
not doomed to wither away (Scharpf 1999).
To say that the rules of the world trade regime, the liberalisation of
capital markets and even deep integration do not significantly reduce the
autonomy of national policymakers is not, however, to imply that domestic
policies do not have to be adapted to constantly changing economic,
political and technological conditions. Welfare states everywhere face
serious problems, but the causes of the current difficulties are mostly related
to factors that have little to do with the growing integration of the world
economy: the impact of demographic changes, domestic opposition to high
tax rates, the failure of traditional social policies to respond to new needs
and risks generated by socio-economic and technical change, ideological
and political shifts.
3. DEEP INTEGRATION AND HARMONISATION
The “diminished democracy” thesis is sometimes combined with a demand
for more international harmonisation. In recent years the idea that the
harmonisation of domestic policies and institutions is a necessary
precondition of free and “fair” trade, has assumed a central position in the
debate about globalisation. Paradoxically, many of the same people who
oppose international economic integration because of the constraints that it
allegedly imposes on national policy preferences, demand the reduction or
even the elimination of domestic diversity in environmental, labour, and
social policies. Jagdish Bhagwati (1996) has critically examined the
philosophical, economic and political arguments that have been advanced in
order to justify such demands. His conclusion is that most such arguments
are technically unsound, and some even lead to morally objectionable
conclusions.
Thus, philosophical arguments to reduce diversity, and hence to limit
the autonomy of national policymakers, often result from a sense of
obligation that citizens of rich countries feel towards the citizens of poorer
countries. This sense of moral obligation seems to legitimate the demand
that rich countries should use their economic and political power to persuade
and, if necessary, coerce weaker countries into adopting higher
environmental and social standards. However, the enforcement of higher
standards is costly. Unless rich countries are prepared to help poorer
countries to meet such costs, the demands of international harmonisation of
environmental and social standards tend to distort the national priorities of8
the developing countries, and even to be captured by economic interests in
the rich countries. This explains why “overarching environmental demands
on resource-strapped nations, backed by a threat of punitive trade sanctions,
may be made not just by environmental groups, but also by protectionist
lobbies who see the resulting possibility of trade sanctions as a benefit to
themselves” (Bhagwati 1996, 13).
Probably the earliest debates on policy harmonisation arose in the
1950s, in connection with the creation of the European Economic
Community. A trace of those debates may be found in the Treaty of Rome,
for example in Article 119 (now Article 141 EC) which states that men and
women should receive equal pay for equal work. The article was introduced
at the demand of France, which feared the competition of other members of
the Community in sectors such as textiles employing a high proportion of
female workers. The problem arose because France had introduced, before
the establishment of the Community, legislation imposing equal pay for men
and women, while other European countries had not. As a result, the relative
wage of women was higher in France than elsewhere. Hence it was feared
that the liberalisation of trade within the common market would handicap
the French industry (Sapir 1996, 552).
In general, however, the Treaty of Rome rejected the idea that the
harmonisation of social policies should precede the establishment of the
common market. Instead, the treaty assumed that such harmonisation would
follow as the consequence of the higher standard of living made possible by
the liberalisation of trade and the integration of the national economies.
Hence, differences in social policies need not be addressed if they reflect
general economic conditions. Differences that create specific distortions
should be eliminated, but harmonisation of national policies is only one of
the methods that can be applied (Sapir 1996, 551). The treaty also rejects the
idea that economic integration requires tax harmonisation. The soundness of
this approach is demonstrated by the fact, noted above, that no race to the
bottom in taxation has taken place in the EU, despite deepening integration.
Still, harmonisation may be needed to the extent that national laws
and regulations create non-tariff barriers to trade, and hence “directly affect
the establishment or functioning of the common market” (Article 94, EC
Treaty). The nature of regulatory harmonisation, however, has changed
radically over the years.9
4. THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATORY HARMONISATION
IN THE EU
From the early 1960s to about 1973 – the date of the first enlargement of the
EC to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark – the European
Commission’s approach to harmonisation was characterised by a distinct
preference for detailed measures designed to regulate exhaustively the
problems in question to the exclusion of previously existing national
regulations – the approach known as total harmonisation. Under total
harmonisation once EC rules have been put in place, a member state’s
capacity to apply stricter rules by evoking the values referred to in Article
36 of the Treaty of Rome (now Article 30 EC) – the protection of the health
and life of humans, animals and plants, and the preservation of national
cultural treasures – is excluded.
For a long time the Court of Justice supported total harmonisation as a
foundation stone in the building of the common market. From the point of
view of market building, total harmonisation has the advantage of
simplicity. Once the Community has acted, national regulations no longer
apply: the common market operates under a common set of rules. This
corresponds to federal pre-emption: the Community enjoys exclusive
competence over the relevant policy area (Weatherill 1995).
To compensate the loss of regulatory sovereignty by the member
states, Article 100 of the Treaty (now Article 94 EC) prescribed that
harmonising directives proposed by the Commission had to be unanimously
approved by the Council before they could become European law. This
unanimity requirement forced the Commission and the Council to engage in
lengthy and sometimes fruitless bargaining. It is easy to imagine the
difficulty of totally harmonising the laws and regulations of six, nine, twelve
and finally fifteen countries differing widely in political, legal and
administrative traditions. Even the process of adapting existing European
regulations to technical progress was so slow as to produce a systematic
regulatory lag.
It is possible that a lack of historical precedents led to a serious
underestimation of the difficulty of total harmonisation. However, the main
reason of the preference for this approach to market integration was
political. In the early days of the Community, harmonisation tended to be
pursued not just to solve concrete regulatory problems but also to drive
forward the general process of European integration. Eventually, however,
this political use of total harmonisation ran into growing opposition from
some member states, particularly after the first enlargement.10
By the mid-1970s the limits of the approach had become clear. As the
Commission was to admit some years later, “[e]xperience has shown that
the alternative of relying on a strategy based totally on harmonisation would
be over-regulatory, would take a long time to implement and could stifle
innovation” (Commission of the European Communities 1985, 17). At the
same time, mounting opposition to what many member states considered
excessive centralisation convinced the Commission that the powers granted
by Article 100 had to used so as to interfere as little as possible with the
regulatory autonomy of the national governments. The emphasis shifted
from total to “optional” and “minimum” harmonisation – and to mutual
recognition.
Optional harmonisation aims to guarantee the right of free movement
of goods while permitting the member states to retain their traditional forms
of regulation. Thus a food speciality, such as cheese made from non–
pasteurised milk, not conforming to European standards may still be
produced for the domestic market.
A particular form of optional harmonisation is provided by the fourth
paragraph of Article 100 a (now Article 95 EC), added to the Treaty of
Rome by the Single European Act. This article introduced qualified majority
voting for internal market legislation, but the member states were not
prepared to give up their veto power, under Article 100, without some
weakening of total harmonisation. Hence, Article 100a (4) provides that: “If,
after the adoption of a harmonisation measure by the Council acting by a
qualified majority, a Member State deems it necessary to apply national
provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to
protection of the environment or the working environment, it shall notify the
Commission of these provisions”.
The national provisions are valid once the Commission has verified
that they are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade. Thus Community harmonisation does not necessarily
exclude the possibility of regulatory action by the member states, where this
is shown to be justified. Article 100 a (4) specifies the permissible grounds
for setting national rules that differ from the Community standard, and
introduces a system of controls involving the Commission as well as the
other member states. Neither restriction applies to the method of minimum
harmonisation. Under this method the national governments must secure the
level of regulation set out in a directive but are permitted to set higher
standards, provided of course that the stricter national rules do not violate
Community law. Like optional harmonisation, minimum harmonisation
liberalises trade without suppressing justifiable regulatory diversity. In the11
areas where minimum harmonisation is the rule – environment, consumer
protection, occupational health and safety — the member states retain
competence, and thus can adapt Community measures to national
preferences. In addition, many EC directives contain options and
exemptions which allow governments to exercise discretion in the
implementation of Community measures with which they are
uncomfortable.
The introduction of the principle of mutual recognition in the late
1970s was another important step towards a more flexible regulatory
system. According to this principle, as stated by the Court of Justice in the
famous  Cassis de Dijon decision, a member state cannot prevent the
marketing within its borders of a product lawfully manufactured and
marketed in another member state. This philosophy was later generalised by
the Commission to cover not only traded goods but also services, as in the
case of the mutual recognition of professional degrees and diplomas. Mutual
recognition provides a framework of general rules within which different
regulatory approaches can compete. The end result is ex post, or bottom-up
harmonisation achieved through market–like processes rather than through
imposition by central regulators as in the case of ex ante, or top-down,
(total) harmonisation.
The trend toward decentralised forms of governance has become
unmistakable in recent years. Article3b of the Treaty on European Union
(now Article 5 of the EC Treaty), which enacts the principles of attribution
of powers, subsidiarity, and proportionality, effectively rules out of court the
notion of a Community continuously moving the boundary posts of its own
competence without explicit treaty revision (Dashwood 1996, 113).
Moreover, the TEU defines new competences in a way that limits the
exercise of Community powers. For example Article 126 adds a new legal
basis for action in the field of education, but the measures the EC can take in
this field are limited to “incentive measures” (e.g., programmes such as
ERASMUS , the scheme for the mobility of university students within the
EU) and to recommendations. Any harmonisation of national laws and
regulations is excluded. Similarly, Article 129 creates specific powers for
the Community in the field of public health, but the competence is highly
circumscribed as subsidiary to that of the member states. Harmonisation is
again ruled out, even though the article states that health protection
requirements shall form a constituent part of the other EC policies. The
other provisions of the TEU, defining new competences in such areas as
culture, consumer protection, and industrial policy, are similarly drafted. In
sum, rather than rely on implicit competences, whose limits seemed out of
control, the TEU opted for an explicit grant that delimits the modes of action12
and the reach of such policies (Weiler 1999). With very few exceptions, the
same approach has been followed by the framers of the Amsterdam and
Nice Treaties.
At the beginning of this section it was pointed out that for a long time
the European Court of Justice supported total harmonisation as a basic
principle of market integration. This method of harmonisation, it will be
recalled, pre-empts action by the member states in the areas to which it
applies. Recently, however, the ECJ has reduced the extent to which
national powers need be pre-empted, even in the core area of regulation of
intra-Community trade. Thus, in the joined cases Keck and Mithouard
(1993, ECR I-6097) the Court pronounced that, “contrary to what has
previously been decided”, the application to products from other member
states of national provisions restricting or prohibiting certain marketing
methods does not violate Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome — which forbids,
inter alia,  regulatory barriers to trade between the member states —
provided the measures apply equally to all traders operating within the
national territory, and affect equally the marketing of all products. Since
Keck and Mithouard the Court has exempted a number of national
regulations from the scope of Article 30 (now Article 28 EC), such as
measures prohibiting Sunday trading, provisions regarding mandatory
closing hours, and legislation limiting the sale of tobacco products to
authorised retailers (Friedbacher 1996).
The move from total to optional and minimum harmonisation, and to
mutual recognition; the restriction of total harmonisation to basic regulatory
objectives; the fact that harmonisation has been explicitly ruled out for most
new EU competences; not least, the jurisprudence of the ECJ referred to
above-- are all indications that in a number of policy areas the Union has
retreated from the classical pre-emption model. The fundamental reason of
this retreat has been explained by Stephen Weatherill: “Total harmonisation
confers on the Community an exclusive competence which it is simply ill-
equipped to discharge... The Community lacks the expertise and the
institutional maturity to exclude the participatory role of national
authorities” (Weatherill 1995, 154).
5. EUROPE’S DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT
At this point, it may be useful to summarise the argument presented in the
preceding pages. We started by considering the diminished-democracy
hypothesis, according to which in an integrating world economy national
policymakers are increasingly constrained in their ability to produce the
public goods the citizens demand. There is, however, little empirical13
evidence that policy choices in democratic countries have been significantly
restricted by the various processes that, together, constitute what is generally
understood as globalisation. Thus, contrary to what is often asserted, the
rules of the GATT/WTO regime leave member countries with full autonomy
to pursue domestic policies within their jurisdiction. The rules step in only
when domestic policy measures have protectionist purposes or effects, or
when they seek to interfere with the policy autonomy of other countries.
In the European Union, we further noted, markets for goods, services
and factors of production are deeply integrated, while most member states
have adopted a common currency. Here, then, we have the best possible test
of the hypothesis that under deep integration the domain of national politics
has to be significantly restricted. In fact, the member states of the EU
remain, for their people, the real arena for democratic politics. As we saw,
the initial attempts to create a common market by the equivalent of federal
pre-emption, have largely failed: the Community simply lacks the material
and normative resources to exclude the participation of the national
authorities from the European policy-making process. Hence the process of
European integration seems to refute Rodrik’s trilemma: even without
regional federalism it is after all possible to integrate national economies
without eliminating the nation-state, and preserving (and, as we shall argue,
even improving) the quality of democratic processes at national level. In
other words, in the EC/EU the problem is not a diminution of democracy at
national level. At issue, rather, is a “democratic deficit” at the supranational
level, that is, the absence or incomplete development of democratic
institutions and processes that the citizens of the Union take for granted in
their own countries. At the same time, however, this deficit of supranational
democracy appears to be necessary not only for economic integration, but
also to protect the rights of citizens even against their own governments and
thus to improve the quality of democracy in the member states . The
explanation of this apparent paradox is the main objective of the second part
of the present paper.
A recurrent theme in the debate about the “democratic deficit” of the
EC/EU is that the powers of the European Parliament (EP) still fall far short
of the powers of an ordinary parliament, while the Commission — a
bureaucratic body – continues to enjoy a nearly total monopoly of legislative
initiative. This is essentially an argument by analogy since it tends to equate
European institutions with familiar national institutions — a parliament with
an independent power of legislative initiative, an executive responsible to
parliament, popular elections to decide who shall govern – or at least to
assume that EU institutions will converge towards such a model (Majone
1998). The most obvious objection to the analogy with the model of14
parliamentary democracy — in any of its national variants – is that the
institutional architecture of the EC/EU has been designed by treaties duly
ratified by national parliaments. One of the characteristic features of this
architecture is the impossibility of mapping functions onto specific
institutions. Thus the Community has no legislature but a legislative process
in which different institution — Council, EP and Commission — have
different parts to play. Similarly, there is no identifiable executive, since
executive powers are exercised for some purposes by the Council acting on
a Commission proposal; for other purposes (e.g., competition matters) by
the Commission; and overwhelmingly by the national administrations
implementing European policies on the ground (Dashwood 1996, 127).
Such institutional arrangements are certainly unusual by the standards
of the classical separation-of-powers doctrine, but they serve essential
functions. Thus, if the treaties make the legislative powers of the Council
and the EP dependent on a proposal from the Commission, this is to link
more closely both Council and EP to European law, and to enhance the
credibility of national commitments to the integration process. For example,
if also the Council had the right to initiate legislation, it could use this power
to turn back the clock of European integration, perhaps for short-run
political advantages. More generally, the institutional architecture of the EC
does not correspond to any contemporary model of democratic governance
but to the much older model of “mixed government”, where democracy
plays a role, but does not represent the ultimate basis of legitimacy (Majone
2002 b).
Another significant difference between the national and the European
levels of governance is the fact that the Community is a system of limited
competences. As already noted, a more precise delimitation of Community
powers was a major result of the TEU. Article 3b of the treaty (now Article
5 EC), which enacts the principles of attribution of powers, of subsidiarity,
and of proportionality as organising principles of the constitutional order of
the Union, marks a shift in the Community’s deep structure (Dashwood
1996, 113).
In addition to the constitutional limitations one must also consider the
material limitations. The EU has no general taxing and spending powers
similar to those held by national governments; and with a budget of less than
1.3 per cent of Union GDP which, moreover, must always be balanced, it
can only undertake a limited range of policies (Majone, 1996 b). These
limitations on the powers of the EC/EU are important also from a normative
viewpoint because questions of legitimacy are basically questions about the
use of power. Hence, standards of legitimacy and accountability historically15
developed to control an omnicompetent state with virtually unlimited
powers to tax and spend, cannot be applied without substantial
modifications to a system of limited competences and resources such as the
EC/EU.
6. THE POLITICAL TRILEMMA AGAIN
While the vast majority of the citizens of the EU support deep economic
integration because of its obvious advantages in terms of consumer choice
and the free movement of people and goods, there is no evidence that a
majority, or even a sizeable minority, are in favour of establishing a
European super-state. But let assume, for the sake of argument, that national
leaders in a moment of self-denying euro-enthusiasm decided to create a
United States of Europe (U.S.E.), and that the national parliaments duly
ratified the new federal constitution. Naturally, this constitution would effect
a significant transfer of powers to the European level. In addition to the
regulatory and monetary powers which the EU already possesses, the U.S.E.
would have, as a minimum, an independent power to tax and spend and
exclusive competencies in foreign and security matters.
Such transfer of powers would entail a severe loss of sovereignty for
the member states, but sovereignty is not the issue with which we are
concerned here. Rather, we want to investigate the implications of the
federalist hypothesis for the viability of participatory democracy at the
transnational level (see figure 2).
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Figure 2: The Real Trilemma
According to Rodrik’s argument mentioned in section 2, a European
federation should permit “mass politics” to flourish. Politics would simply
relocate there, just as in the USA “the most contentious political battles...
are fought not at the state level, but at the federal level” (Rodrik 2000, 183).16
But this is hardly a useful way to think about the issue of transnational
democracy in Europe since, as James Buchanan writes: “It is mockery to use
“federalism” or “federal union” in descriptive reference to the United
States... which is, of course, simply a very large nation-state” (Buchanan
1990, 6). While, directly or indirectly, the U.S. government can regulate or
control most of the activities of the state or local governments, it is highly
unlikely that something like this will ever be true in Europe.
Any federal union in Europe would have to respect the historical,
cultural and institutional diversity which is the hallmark of the old continent.
In particular, it would have to respect what a distinguished historian has
called the most fundamental peculiarity of European society — the absolute
primacy of the territorial state over all competing principles of social
cohesion (McNeill 1974). It may be useful to point out that the idea of the
primacy of the territorial state has the same origin as the idea of democracy,
namely in the Greek polis. Cleisthenes (about 570 to 508 BC) is regarded as
the founder of Athenian democracy. His most important innovation was the
basing of individual political rights and duties on citizenship of a locality
rather than membership in a clan. In this way, Cleisthenes brought the
territorial principle to triumph over the kinship principle or other possible
principles of social organisation. This explains at least in part why, even
today, it is still so difficult to think about democracy outside the framework
of the nation-state and why, therefore, the very notion of transnational
democracy appears so problematic.
Democratic theory presupposes a territorially based demos, but there
is no European demos, let alone a European nation. The absence of a
European demos implies, inter alia, that a basic criterion for the democratic
process could not be satisfied at European level. This is the criterion of final
agenda control which Robert Dahl (1989, 113) formulates as follows: “the
demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how matters are to be
placed on the agenda of matters that are to be decided by means of the
democratic process”. If the criterion cannot be satisfied at European level, as
we show below, then it follows that the “diminished democracy” thesis —
the argument about the declining ability of democratic policymakers to
provide the public goods the citizens demand — is more likely to be true in
the case of a European federal state than at national level .
It is important to understand clearly why the criterion of final agenda
control cannot be satisfied in a federation composed of states deeply divided
along cultural, social, institutional and economic lines. Observe, first, that
like the democratic process itself, the majority principle presupposes the
existence of a fairly homogeneous polity. Only in such a polity are majority17
decisions considered legitimate and hence accepted also by the outvoted
minority. In fact, empirical research has shown conclusively that, in polities
divided into virtually separate sub-societies with their own political parties,
interest groups and media of communication, the majority principle is often
rejected in favour of non-majoritarian institutions (Lijphart 1984; Lijphart et
al. 1993). This research is clearly relevant to the European Union — and a
fortiori to a would-be European federation.
Now, non-homogeneous polities find it very difficult, if not
impossible, to pursue redistributive and other policies with clearly identified
winners and losers. Redistribution of income and wealth is a zero-sum game
since the gain of one group in society is the loss of another group. Public
decisions concerning redistribution can only be taken by majority vote
because any issue over which there is unavoidable conflict is defeated under
any more inclusive rule. It follows that in a transnational federation all such
policies would have to be excluded from the public agenda as being too
divisive. This is the main reason why redistributive social policy plays such
a small role in EU governance (Majone 1996b).
It is true that the funds allocated to regional redistribution have grown
considerably in recent years. It not clear, however, that regional
redistribution should be considered an instrument of social policy rather
than a side-payment to induce the poorer member states to accept deep
economic integration. The problem with the former interpretation is that
there is an important distinction between reducing inequality among
individuals (the main objective of social policy) and reducing disparities
among regions. Since most regions contain a mix of rich and poor people, a
policy aimed at redistributing resources to a poor region may be
implemented in such a way as to favour mostly rich individuals within that
region. The problems of targeting regions to achieve a better distribution of
personal income are particular severe in federal systems. Even in the United
States, where the federal government pays three-quarters of the cost of
welfare assistance, states insist on defining the standards of need and setting
the benefit levels. As a consequence, the level of welfare assistance among
the American states varies widely, more so than interstate disparities in
wage rates or cost of living (Peterson and Rom 1990). In Europe too the
countries which benefit most from regional aid, foremost among them
Spain, are strongly opposed to individualised transfers of EU funds.
In sum, the delicate value judgements about the appropriate balance
of efficiency and equity which social policies express, can be made
legitimately only within fairly homogeneous polities. It is difficult to see
how generally accepted levels of income redistribution could be determined18
centrally in a federation where levels of economic development and
political, administrative and legal traditions differ widely, and where,
therefore, majoritarian principles can play only a limited role. The inclusion
of income redistribution in the public agenda of a transnational federation
would not improve its democratic legitimacy, but only increase the level of
conflict among its constituent states. In the situation envisaged here, even
the democratic legitimacy of a popularly elected federal parliament would
be questioned. This is because the parliament — which is supposed to
represent a non-existent transnational demos — would be unable to respond
to national demands and thus would be viewed as an imperfect form of
democratic representation, when not as an instrument of centralisation.
Already in 1862 Lord Acton analysed the intrinsic limitations of
parliamentary representation in imperial Austria in very similar terms. The
conclusion of the great liberal historian was that “in those countries where
different races dwell together... the power of the imperial parliament must
be limited as jealously as the power of the crown, and many of its functions
must be discharged by provincial diets, and a descending series of local
authorities” (Lord Acton 1967 [1862], 156).
Which policies then could be legitimately included in the agenda of a
European federal state? Aside from foreign and security policy, the public
agenda would mostly include efficiency-enhancing, market-preserving
policies — a combination of liberalisation and “negative integration” i.e.,
measures to remove obstacles to the free movement of people, services,
goods and capital within the territory of the federation. Unlike
redistribution, efficiency issues may be thought of as positive-sum games
where everybody can gain, provided the right policy is adopted. In principle,
efficient policies could be adopted by unanimity. The unanimity rule
guarantees that the result of collective choice is efficient in the Pareto sense,
since anybody adversely affected by a collective decision can veto it.
Naturally, unanimity is practically impossible in a large polity because of
high transaction costs and the possibility that the veto power may be used
strategically, but there are second-best alternatives such as supermajorities
or delegation of problem-solving tasks to non-political expert agencies. The
important point for the present discussion is that efficiency-enhancing
policies do not need a strong normative foundation: the substantive
legitimacy provided by accountability-by-results is generally sufficient.
Redistributive policies, on the other hand, need the procedural legitimacy of
majority rule and hence place too heavy a burden on the fragile normative
foundation of a transnational polity.19
7. MARKET-PRESERVING FEDERALISM
Returning to Figure 2, we have shown that the viability of a transnational
democratic polity — such as a would-be European federation — requires
not only an irrevocable transfer of national sovereignty, but also a very
constrained public agenda. Hence, the principle of full agenda control could
not be satisfied and democracy would be seriously diminished . Note that
this is true even if a majority of the citizens of the transnational polity
support a given measure, as long as the opponents of the measure are
concentrated in a few member states where they are actually a majority of
the voters. In a federation of polities sharply divided along linguistic,
political and institutional lines – and lacking the sense of national solidarity
generated by shared historical memories – any measure by the central
government that differentially damages (or favours) the citizens of the
separate states or regions within its territory, creates serious constitutional
and legitimacy problems.
For these reasons, the only kind of federalism that could be viable in
today’s Europe is the one Barry Weingast calls “market-preserving
federalism”. A federal system is market-preserving if it satisfies three
conditions: 1) Member states have primary regulatory responsibility over the
economy; 2) A common market is ensured, preventing the national
governments from using their regulatory authority to erect trade barriers
against the goods and services from other member states; 3) The member
states face a hard budget constraint, meaning that they have neither the
ability to print money, nor access to unlimited credit (Weingast 1995, 4). By
and large, these conditions are already satisfied in the European Union. The
first condition holds because of the limited role of total harmonisation and
because of national autonomy in fiscal matters; condition 2 corresponds to
the strict prohibition of any unjustified obstacle to intra-Community trade —
what has been referred to as “negative integration”; while condition 3
corresponds to the criteria the member states must satisfy in order to qualify
for membership in the European Monetary Union. Thus, a federal Europe
could not do much more than what the Union is already doing in the socio-
economic area, without creating insoluble legitimacy problems.
To round off our discussion of the political trilemma of economic
integration, we briefly consider the case of confederation. It will be recalled
that confederations are associations of independent states that in order to
secure some common purpose, agree to certain limitations on their freedom
of action and establish some common machinery of deliberation and
decision. A measure of transnational democracy could be achieved , for
example through direct popular election of the legislative assembly or of the20
chief executive. The problem is that confederations typically lack
institutions strong enough to ensure the economic integration of the
component units. Thus the Articles of Confederation (1781-9) that preceded
the federal constitution of the United States, established a Congress of the
confederation as a unicameral assembly of representatives, each possessing
a single vote. Although the Congress was given authority in important areas
such as foreign affairs, defence, and the establishment of coinage and
weights and measures, it lacked both an independent source of revenue and
the institutional means to establish a common market among the former
colonies. Also the constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 1815 proved
unable to create a common market out of the local economies of the 22
cantons. Economic integration was achieved only by the stronger federal
constitution of 1848.
In sum, the confederal solution preserves national sovereignty and can
also achieve a modest level of democracy, but at the expense of economic
integration. The federal model, on the other hand, presents a double risk. If
the federal government — which we assume to have an independent power
of taxation – is strong enough to create a common market, it may be also
strong enough to centralise, sooner or later, all important policy decisions.
History suggests that this development is most likely in fairly homogeneous
polities such as the United States, Germany or Australia. The opposite risk
arises in the case of a deeply segmented polity. In such a case, as we saw,
the federal agenda would have to be so severely restricted that people would
continue to look to their own state governments for the solution of their
problems. As a consequence, participative democracy could not flourish at
the federal level.
8. DEMOCRACY AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS
We have reached the conclusion that democracy as we know it — a system
of government responsive to the wishes of the citizens – could not thrive in
a European federation or in any other transnational polity whose component
units are divided by deep historical, cultural, economic and other cleavages.
The absence of a strong feeling of national solidarity means that social and
other policies which historically have legitimated the nation-state, could not
be transferred to the higher level of governance: transnational democracy
would be, at best, a diminished democracy. Before discussing the broader
implications of this conclusion it is important to point out that the theory and
practice of democracy have changed dramatically in history. Dahl (1989)
identifies three crucial transformations. The first transformation took place
during the fist half of the fifth century BC when several Greek city-states
which had been governed by monarchs, aristocrats or tyrants, were21
transformed into systems in which a substantial number of citizens were
entitled to participate in governing. Political decisions came to be taken by a
majority vote preceded by free public debate. Direct citizen participation,
not only in law-making but also in administration, was such an essential
element of the Greek idea of democracy that Greeks found it very difficult
to conceive of representative government, much less to accept it as a
legitimate alternative to direct democracy.
While it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of the Greek
experience for human civilisation, for the purpose of the present discussion
it is important to appreciate the limitations of the classical view of
democracy. From a contemporary democratic perspective, one crucially
important limit of Greek democracy was that citizenship was highly
exclusive, both internally and externally (Dahl 1989, 20-23). Within the
city-state, a large part of the adult population (women, long-term residents,
and their descendants, slaves) was denied full citizenship. Externally, the
exclusiveness of classical democracy is revealed by the fact that genuine
federal systems — as distinct from leagues or confederacies, often under the
guidance and control of a hegemonic city — failed to develop in Greece.
Every attempt to establish a true federation “was shipwrecked on the
inability of the Polis to moderate its love of autonomy and fit itself into a
larger whole” (Ehrenberg 1969, 118-9): the face of the polis, as Ehrenberg
writes, was almost completely turned inwards. And because Greek
democracy lacked the means and the desire to extend the rule of law beyond
the narrow limits of the city-state, in their external relations the city-states
lived in a state of almost continuos warfare – until peace was forced on them
by a foreign power, first Macedonia and then Rome.
The exclusiveness of Greek democracy had serious consequences also
in the area of individual rights. It is a much discussed question to what
extent the freedom of the polis included the freedom of the individual. At
any rate, it meant freedom within the state and not freedom from the state
(Ehrenberg 1969, 95). This is why nineteenth century liberals like Benjamin
Constant argued that the modern conception of liberty – as a private sphere
of choice protected by individual rights — differs radically from the ancient
conception of liberty as citizens sharing in public decision making and the
exercise of power. A fortiori, Greek democracy failed to acknowledge the
existence of universal claims to freedom, equality or human and political
rights. Only after the breakdown of the polis in the second century AC did a
new conception of universal individual rights emerge. In place of a law
rooted in the tradition of a single city-state the Stoic philosophers proposed
a law for the “city of the world”. In place of the exclusiveness of Greek
democracy, they advanced the new conception of a world-wide human22
brotherhood, the idea that men are by nature equal, despite differences of
race, rank and wealth (Sabine 1960, 151-8). Thus Stoicism revised the
political ideas of the city-state to fit the reality of the new transnational
societies created by the Hellenistic and Roman empires.
The second democratic transformation took place two thousand years
after the first one. It resulted from the union of democracy with
representation — the possibility that a legislative assembly might
legitimately consist not of the entire body of citizens but only of their
elected representatives. It is instructive to observe that representation was
not invented by democrats but developed instead as a medieval institution of
monarchical, aristocratic and mixed government, and of the conciliar
movement in the Church. This is not the only case of non-democratic
institutions being adopted in order to extend and improve the practice of
democracy. Another important example is constitutionalism (see section 9)
which, in its modern form, was first theorised by Bodin (1530-1596) and by
Althusius (1557-1638).
Through the institution of representation, it became possible to extend
to idea of democracy to the large domain of the nation-state. To quote Dahl
(1989, 30): “Thus the idea of democracy, which might have perished with
the disappearance of city-states, became relevant to the modern world of
nation-states. Within the far larger domain of the nation-state, new
conceptions of personal rights, individual freedom and personal autonomy
could flourish. Moreover, important problems that could never be solved
within the narrow limits of the city-state... might be dealt with more
effectively by a government capable of making laws and regulations over a
far larger territory. To this extent, the capacity of citizens to govern
themselves was greatly enhanced”.
Representative democracy presents another important advantage: it
makes possible the existence of a civil society separate from the state and
independent from it. Direct democracy, as practised by the Greeks, meant
citizen participation not only in law-making but also in administration. Such
total devotion to public affairs was possible only in a society founded on
slave labour, hence the paradox, pointed out by Rousseau in Book III of the
Social Contract, that perhaps liberty can be maintained only on a basis of
slavery: “extremes meet”! Because life in the polis was so completely
politicised, it was impossible for the citizens to carve out a sphere of private
values and beliefs. By contrast, the separation of state and civil society, in
particular of politics and economics, became one of the corner stones of
liberal representative democracy.23
Thus, the second transformation simultaneously contracted and
expanded the limits of democracy. Direct participation by the demos in the
making and implementation of laws was no longer possible, but it became
feasible to extend democracy and the rule of law to an entire nation-state.
The sense of community nurtured by repeated interactions in face-to-face
assemblies was lost, but the individual gained protection and security
against the discretionary power of an omnicompetent majority. It became
impossible to assume a widely shared conception of the public interest, but
the democratic nation-state could accept a much greater diversity of groups
and interests than the polis, and prove that such diversity need not be
destructive of the polity.
We are now in the midst of a dramatic change, a third transformation,
in the scale of decision making as more and more policy competences are
transferred from the national to the transnational level-- or are exercised
jointly by the two levels. In the following pages I suggest that the
implications of the third transformation for the theory and practice of
democracy will likely be quite different from those of the second
transformation. The challenge for democrats today is less to build full-
fledged democratic institutions at the transnational level — an impossible
task, we argued, in the absence of a demos — than to use the higher level in
order to improve the quality of democracy at national and sub-national level.
The experience of the European Union shows that a rule-based system of
co-operation and dispute resolution can not only civilise relations among
sovereign states by eliminating the excesses of narrowly conceived national
interest; by protecting the rights of citizens even against their own
governments, such a system strengthens the foundations of liberal
democracy which have been eroded by decades of unlimited executive
discretion. In this sense, the “virtuous triangle” of Figure 3 may represent
the third transformation of democracy in an increasingly interdependent
world.
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Figure 3: The Virtuous Triangle24
9. TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
All contemporary western democracies are constitutional democracies, but
“democracy” and “constitutionalism” are historically and conceptually
distinct ideas. While a constitution is an instrument to limit, control and
divide the power of governments, democracy — at least in its populist
version — tends to concentrate potentially unlimited power in the hands of
the current majority. According to the populist model, majorities should be
able “to control all of government — legislative, executive and, if they have
a mind to, judicial — and thus to control everything politics can touch”
(Spitz 1984, quoted in Lijphart 1991, 485). By contrast, constitutional rules
are exempted from the majoritarian controls that govern ordinary legislation
and are enforced by apolitical courts. The effect of such rules is to remove
certain decisions, for example concerning fundamental rights, from the
electoral process and thus to tie the hands of the current majority.
It is not difficult to understand why some democrats consider the
expression “constitutional democracy” an oxymoron — a combination of
contradictory ideas. Yet, more careful reflection soon reveals why a
constitutionally unconstrained democracy is not only more unstable but also
less efficient than a liberal, constitutional democracy. To understand the
positive role of constitutional limitations, it may be helpful to keep in mind
the general principle that constraints can be “blessings in disguise” in the
sense that it is often possible to take advantage of them. The familiar
phenomenon of friction is a good illustration (Majone 1989).
In somewhat similar fashion, constitutional constraints can improve
the efficiency of democracy, for instance by limiting arbitrary discretion and
enhancing the credibility of long-term policy commitments. One of the
defining features of democracy is that it is a form of government pro
tempore (Linz 1998). The time limit inherent in the requirement of elections
at regular intervals is one of the main arguments for democracy, but it also
implies that the policies of the current majority can be subverted,
legitimately and without compensation, by a new majority with different and
perhaps opposing interests. This may be expressed by saying that in a
democracy political property rights – the rights to exercise public authority
in a given policy area — are ill-defined (Moe 1990). The uncertainty created
by the lack of well-defined political property rights is one aspect of the
commitment problem of democratic leaders. The other aspect is represented
by the discretionary powers of the government between elections.
Discretionary policymaking leads to the phenomenon of “time
inconsistency”. Time inconsistency occurs when a government’s optimal
long-run policy differs from its optimal short-run policy, so that the
government in the short-run has an incentive to renege on its long-term25
commitments. Without a binding rule holding it to the long-run policy, the
government may switch to what now appears to be a better policy. The
problem is that if people anticipate such a policy switch, they will behave in
ways that prevent policymakers achieving their original objective.
For example, a policy of low inflation may be optimal in the long run.
But at any time there can be short-run political gains from surprise inflation.
If the policymakers have the possibility of revising the original policy to
achieve such short-term gains, private actors will recognise this and change
their behaviour in such a way that the outcome is worse than if the ex ante
optimal policy had always been adhered to. One way to solve this particular
time-inconsistency problem is to delegate monetary policy to a central bank
whose independence is constitutionally guaranteed, as is the case with the
European Central Bank (Majone 2001). Again, we saw that the Treaty of
Rome assigns to the Commission the monopoly of legislative initiative, so
that neither the Council nor the Parliament can initiate policy without a
previous proposal from the Commission. This monopoly of legislative
initiative, which in itself is a serious violation of the principles of
parliamentary democracy, is best understood as a form of pre-commitment:
if also the Council or the EP had the right to initiate Community legislation,
this would mean that these political institutions could renege on their
commitment to European integration, and thus compromise the core of the
acquis communautaire.
But the influence of the European rules on the political life of the
member states goes a good deal deeper than our example suggests.
Constitutional scholars have written about the “eclipse of constitutionalism”
in twentieth century Europe (Matteucci 1993, 161-68). During this period,
the need to tax, spend and borrow to finance two world wars and extensive
welfare provisions greatly increased the economic role of the state. The
constitutional consequence was to strengthen the executive branch of
government. The assumption of macroeconomic responsibilities by the
“Keynesian state” further extended the already wide discretionary powers of
the executive. In the end, it was inevitable that an old constitutional truth
would be rediscovered: that discretionary powers can be abused and that the
prevention of such abuse is, at least in part, a matter of institutional and
constitutional design (Harden 1994, 615). In Europe the rediscovery of the
virtues of constitutionalism was greatly facilitated, perhaps even made
possible, by the integration process.
Recall that Keynesian policies require not only extensive
discretionary powers to “fine-tune” the economy, but also the separateness
of the national economies. The creation of a common European market and26
the attendant rules of market liberalisation and negative integration meant
that governments could no longer pursue protectionist policies within the
EC, nor tolerate the existence of public or private monopolies within the
national borders. The discipline imposed on state subsidies and on the
criteria of public procurement further reduced the discretionary powers of
the national executives — and the various forms of rent-seeking and
political corruption which usually accompany administrative decisions in
these areas. The rules and institutions of monetary union represent another
important constitutional limitation on the unconstrained discretionary
policies of the past.
It would be quite wrong to assume that the impact of supranational
constitutionalism on the national level is limited to the economic sphere.
Through the principle of “direct effect” and in other ways, the European
Court of Justice has progressively extended the rights of individuals under
EC law, and the duties of national courts to protect those rights, even against
the national governments. For example, Article 190 of the Treaty of Rome
(now Article 253 EC) imposes a reason-giving requirement on all European
institutions. When the Rome Treaty was drafted, there was no general
requirement to give reasons in the law of the member states, so that these
constitutional provisions were not only different from, but in advance of,
national laws. Even today, for example, English public law still lacks a
general obligation on public administrators to give reasons for their
decisions.. Nonetheless, the ECJ is quite prepared to impose such obligation
upon the national authorities in order that individuals be able to protect their
rights under European law. Thus in the Heylens  case (Case
222/86[1987]ECR4097), the Court reasoned that effective protection
requires that the individual be able to defend his or her right under the best
possible conditions. This would involve judicial review of the national
authority’s decision restricting that right. For judicial review to be effective,
however, the national court must be able to call upon the authority to
provide its reasons (Thomas 1997, 218). The powers of the ECJ to exercise
constitutional and administrative review not only over all Community acts,
but also over many acts of the member states, are by now well established.
Nothing like the ECJ exists at the international level, but significant
progress in the constitutionalisation of international economic relations has
been made in the framework of multilateral institutions like the International
Monetary Fund and, especially, the GATT/WTO. In the latter case,
particular importance attaches to the mechanisms of dispute resolution.
Trade disputes under the WTO are now subject to binding adjudication in an
institution that looks more and more like an international court. Today’s
situation is a striking contrast to the early days of GATT, when the “working27
parties” set up to report on disputes between member states were really a
forum for encouraging negotiation, not a third-party investigation for the
purpose of coming to objective conclusions on the merits of the case. It was
not until 1952 that the member states resorted to the panel procedures which
have become the standard means of dispute resolution within the
GATT/WTO. Panels no longer included representatives from the disputing
parties, and major trading nations were no longer automatically panel
members.
The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) led to a new Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. The
Understanding creates an automatic right in a complainant country to the
creation of a panel, unless a consensus exists to refuse the panel. In 1984 the
member states were asked to submit the names of qualified non-
governmental  experts who might serve on panels. The Uruguay Round
Understanding goes even further, and dictates the expansion and
improvement of the non-governmental roster. Above all, the Understanding
created an integrated dispute settlement mechanism for all parts of the
GATT/WTO system, to be administered by a Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB). A new appeal process was also introduced. Appeals from panel
decisions are possible on matters of law to panels of three drawn from a
rotating pool of seven persons of demonstrated expertise in international
trade appointed by the DSB, and who are to be available at all times on short
notice. The Appellate Body is to submit its report within sixty days of an
appeal being filed. After the first years of application of the Understanding
there seems to be a widespread opinion that the WTO procedures for settling
disputes are quite successful. They have been heavily utilised and have
become an integral part of international economic diplomacy (Trebilcock
and Howse 1995; Jackson 1997).
10. CONCLUSIONS
The constitutionalisation of the EC/EU and the evolution of dispute-
resolution mechanisms in the GATT/WTO are outstanding examples of a
general trend: the transition from a power-oriented to a rule-oriented
approach to international relations. Under the former approach, international
disputes are settled by negotiations where the relative bargaining power of
the parties inevitably counts a great deal. Failure to reach agreement would
involve the use of all instruments of retaliation — economic, political,
possibly even military — available to the more powerful country.
Understandably, a small country would hesitate to oppose a large one on
whom its trade and international position depend. Under a rule-oriented
approach, on the other hand, disputes are resolved by reference to norms28
which both parties have agreed. An unsettled international dispute would
ultimately be resolved by impartial third-party judgements based on explicit
rules. Thus, negotiators would be negotiating with reference to their
respective predictions as to the outcomes of those judgements, and not with
reference to the power at the disposal of the various parties to the dispute
(Jackson 1997, 109-110).
A rule-based system has obvious advantages for the smaller or poorer
members of the international community: as the Greek sophists taught more
than two thousand years ago, the strong does not need laws. Hence the
movement towards a rule-based system of international relations mirrors,
and in a sense recapitulates, the process of progressive constitutionalisation
of democratic governments during the last two centuries. What is perhaps
even more important, transnational constitutionalism can improve the
quality of democracy at the national level. A power-oriented approach
favours the use of executive discretion and the secrecy of traditional
diplomacy. By contrast, a rule-based system facilitates democratic
accountability, citizen participation and public debate. This is because
international rules — not only the rules of GATT/WTO or other
international organisations, but also treaties dealing with environmental
protection, human rights or European integration — have to be ratified by
national parliaments, may be subject to popular referenda, and are open to
the scrutiny of courts, interest groups, NGOs and scholarly opinion.
In short, the greatest contribution of transnational constitutionalism to
the idea and practice of democracy consists, to paraphrase Joseph Weiler
(1999, 341), in affirming the values of the liberal nation-state by policing its
boundaries against abuse. Now, the main lesson of European integration is
that supranational rules can be quite effective even without the traditional
state monopoly of coercive power — provided they are monitored and
enforced by strong institutions like the European Commission and the Court
of Justice. The recent strengthening of the WTO as an organisation suggests
that this lesson has been learned by the international community. In order to
move from a power-based to a rule-based approach to international
relations, therefore, democratic states must be prepared to delegate
significant powers to international organisations. We have argued that it is
both unrealistic and unhelpful to demand that such organisations be
evaluated according to the democratic standards we apply to the institutions
of the nation-state. Actually, even at the national level the role of non-
majoritarian institutions like constitutional courts and politically
independent central banks and regulatory agencies, has been growing
continuously in recent years. Thus, in an increasingly interdependent world
the third transformation of democracy cannot consist in a mechanical29
extrapolation of democratic principles and institutions to areas and levels of
governance where democracy, as we know it, cannot flourish. Rather,
parliaments and electorally accountable policymakers will have to devise
more effective ways of enforcing accountability on non-majoritarian
institutions at national and supranational level, while respecting their
independence.
Giandomenico Majone, EUI, Florence
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